Riedel quite ignores however, the pressing American
desire to contain China in 2015. And its need to use sizeable and
populous India for the purpose, in the
South Asian and Indian Ocean theatre certainly, but also as a soft power
globally.
While there may an element of veracity in this
scenario, with India and the US each looking at it from their own unique, and
not necessarily common perspectives, it is far from the whole truth. India’s
adversarial and mistrustful attitude towards China has changed under Modi, who seems
willing to leave behind the humiliations of 1962 in the interests of ‘The Asian
Century’.
As for the long-standing Western tendency to
hyphenate India and Pakistan, and even the needs of SAARC versus those of India;
even the US now, more often than not, looks at India and China together
instead. The hostility of the West regarding India as a Soviet stooge is now
truly gone.
Pakistan, failing, near bankrupt, troublesome,
devious, and bristling with terrorists, seems to have disappeared into China’s
armpit in strategic terms, particularly after the US pull-out from Afghanistan
and more so after China’s recent $47 billion dollar embrace. And though the Sunni jihadis/mujahideen in ISIS is threatening the world by saying it is on the brink of acquiring a nuclear weapon from Pakistan, Western intelligence sees it more as a Saudi/Pakistani prompted ploy. A scare tactic designed to retard the normalisation of relations with Shi’ite Iran, and the lifting of cruel sanctions against it after decades.
But this ISIS boast could well turn out to be real,
if its supporters go through with their plan to create a true Frankenstein.
This could precipitate an unprecedented and sudden nuclear conflict with a
savage ‘non-state actor’. But till then, it is a matter for the covert
organisations like Mossad, the CIA, MI-6, the successors of the KGB, and others,
to head off the Pakistani ISI and ISIS
nexus at the pass. Pakistan itself may have to be quarantined, and its nuclear
weapons brought under firm international control.
And India’s relationship with Russia, though
nostalgic about the vanished alliance
with the USSR, has much less going for it now, in a new, multi-polar world, in
which India too aspires to become one of those poles.
And this irrespective of earning a seat as a
permanent member in the UNSC, because there will inevitably have to be other
inductees such as Germany, Israel, Japan, perhaps even Pakistan, in addition to the present five. But India is
working on its wider responsibilities, even visiting the little staging points
in the Indian Ocean to suit.
The expanded UN Security Council, should it happen,
promises to become even more factional and unwieldy than it is at present. But
the fact that there are multiple new contenders underscores the point that the
world has turned de facto multi-polar. This, in the absence of US
willingness to being globocop in perpetuity.
Apart from the ideological reservations it may have
in this regard, even the US cannot afford the responsibility to keep the ‘free
world safe from harm’, with its humungous associated costs; any more than Britain could keep up with any more than symbolic
commitments to its erstwhile empire in the Commonwealth.
Therefore each nation must work out the terms of its
coexistence, and the bilateral relationship is as important as any G-8, ASEAN,
SAARC, and so on.
One obvious reason for us not necessarily getting
under the eiderdown with America in any kind of tight embrace, is because India
today is not comfortable substituting being a Soviet satellite with becoming an
American one. There are unfortunately no guarantees in today’s world, even if
we were to do so, as Australia under ANZACS and indeed NATO, is finding out.
In reality too, though we may need new friends and allies,
we are not keen on playing a tied and hobbled foreign policy game for uncertain
reciprocity with anyone.
China, on its part, is eager, now that Tibet is
firmly in its grasp, and the erstwhile Middle Kingdom is clear and away the
second biggest economic power in the world, to control the irritants of the
colonial British McMahon Line. Instead, it wants to ramp up its business
cooperation with India. China too hopes to exert a great deal of geopolitical
influence on India in the process.
India, on its part, must consider its own advantages
along its growth path, forging multiple and overlapping alliances as it does so.
To an extent, working with China and Japan simultaneously already demonstrates
this outlook.
Meanwhile, India is inching closer to oil rich and
Shi’ite Iran, having signed an agreement to develop its Chabahar port at last, (tacitly approved by the US, which is doing some removal of obstacles in
its relationship with Iran itself), but much
to the chagrin of both Saudi Arabia and Israel. This development will give us a
new sea-land route to friendly and mineral rich Afghanistan , and help us pipe
in Iranian/Omani gas as well, without involving access via Pakistan in both
instances.
The Indian move to close the gap with Iran has no
doubt been noted by China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the US, Saudi Arabia, Israel,
amongst others. But, in today’s geopolitics, it will not get in the way of
strengthening bilateral relationships with each country, and others such as
Iraq and Oman in the region, as well.
Strategic new beginnings with Australia, Canada,
Saudi Arabia, France, Britain, Russia, America, China, Mongolia, South Korea,
Myanmar, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Nepal , Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Mauritius, The
Seychelles, Fiji and so on, have all been undertaken over the last year.
Between Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj, and other senior officials, a total of 102
countries have been visited.
While some quarters both at home and abroad have
failed to grasp the significance of Modi’s great foreign policy churn, others
see it as a classic manthan, bound to yield great benefits, not only in
the second year of this administration, but for years to come. May 26th, 2015
Gautam Mukherjee
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